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Our thinking is unavoidably constrained by our conceptual structures. To the extent 
that we refl ect on and reconstruct our concepts, however, we can sharpen our think-
ing. The fi rst section of this article considers the nature of concepts, highlighting a 
standard distinction between prototype-based and formal concepts. 
Drawing on these insights from cognitive psychology, the second section sug-
gests that the ability to recognize and understand genocides is greatly restricted by 
Holocaust-based conceptions of genocide. In turn one can enhance one’s under-
standing via the construction and application of formal concepts of genocide. 
Extending this argument, I observe in the third section that genocide, however 
defi ned, has come to be seen as the ultimate human rights catastrophe, and thus the 
measure of all such catastrophes. Implicitly or explicitly, we routinely construe and 
evaluate mass killings, cultural exterminations, ethnic cleansings, political disap-
pearances, religious inquisitions, chattel slavery, and other catastrophic violations of 
human rights through the lens of genocide. This often illuminates the genocidal as-
pects of diverse atrocities, but it also hinders and distorts our understanding of mat-
ters that cannot and should not be understood only in relation to genocide. 
Finally, I consider the scientifi c and educational implications of the present ar-
guments. By articulating, discussing, coordinating, and refl ecting on diverse histor-
ical cases and diverse formal criteria for genocide and other human rights catastro-
phes, and by encouraging students to do so as well, we can foster the construction 
of defensible formal conceptions and an accompanying consciousness about the 
nature and limits of those conceptions. We cannot escape the constraints inherent 
in conceptual thought, but we can always transcend the limitations of our current 
concepts. 
The nature of concepts 
In the normal course of perceiving and interpreting events, our concepts are, for the 
most part, invisible to us. Rather than refl ecting on them, we see the world through 
them. In fact, it is only through concepts that we are able to identify and make sense 
of the various aspects of the world. What appear to us as objective representations 
imposed on our minds by reality itself are always in large part a function of the 
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network of conceptions to which we have assimilated that reality. Thus, the na-
ture of our concepts to a large degree determines not only our subjective interpre-
tations but even our most elementary, and seemingly objective, observations and 
categorizations. 
The unavoidable subjectivity of conceptual thought, however, does not entail a 
radical relativism that dismisses objectivity and truth as illusions. Despite their in-
trinsic subjectivity, our observations and interpretations are also a function of re-
alities outside our minds. Although we cannot directly represent simple and abso-
lute truths about the world, neither are we limited to illusions generated by arbitrary 
concepts. Perception is a joint function of the realities around us and the concep-
tions to which we assimilate those realities. Objectivity is not an achievable end but 
it remains an important epistemic ideal that can be approached by coordinating, re-
fl ecting on, and reconstructing our conceptual structures (Moshman, 1998, 1999). 
Given the crucial importance of concepts to perception, knowledge, thinking, 
and development, it is not surprising that cognitive and developmental psycholo-
gists have devoted much time and energy to the study of human conceptual struc-
tures (Case, 1998; Reed, 2000; Rosser, 1994). An important consideration in such 
work, and one that is central to the present analysis, is a distinction between formal 
and prototype-based concepts. 
Formal concepts are defi ned on the basis of a set of necessary and/or suffi cient 
conditions. To be a square, for example, a fi gure must have precisely two dimen-
sions, four equal sides, and four right angles. Formal concepts, then, foster sharp 
categorizations. A given fi gure either is or is not a square. All squares, moreover, re-
gardless of size or color, are equally square. 
Prototype-based concepts, on the other hand, are defi ned on the basis of prototyp-
ical instances. Thus, although robins and ostriches are both birds, people see robins 
as better exemplars of the concept “bird.” Ostriches are less bird-like. Moreover, al-
though biologists have no doubt that ostriches are birds, there is room for disagree-
ment about how to classify archaeopteryx and other transitional forms. To the extent 
that a concept is prototype-based, there are likely to be marginal cases that are not 
suffi ciently like the prototype to fi t clearly in the same category but not suffi ciently 
different to fall clearly outside that category. 
Human conceptual structures are undoubtedly too complex to be fully understood 
in terms of a simple distinction between formal and prototype-based concepts. Nev-
ertheless, as we will now see, such a distinction is useful in understanding how peo-
ple perceive and think about genocide. 
Conceptual constraints on thinking about genocide
The primary conceptual constraint on thinking about genocide, I argue, is the domi-
nance of a Holocaust-based conception of genocide. The problem is not that the Ho-
locaust, rather than some other genocide, has been taken to be prototypical. Given 
that every genocide is unique, any prototype-based concept of genocide will distort 
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one’s understanding of some genocides as it fi lters them through whatever genocide 
taken as central and defi ning. The challenge, I conclude, is not to replace the Ho-
locaust with some other genocide as the measure of all genocides, but rather to re-
place a Holocaust-based concept of genocide with an alternative conception that re-
lates all genocides to each other via a set of formal criteria. 
Holocaust-based conceptions of genocide 
It has come to be understood that by the Holocaust (with a capital H) we mean a 
particular historical event and not just anything that might be called a holocaust 
(Petrie, 2000). The specifi c term Holocaust has both a narrow and a broader mean-
ing. In the narrow sense, the term refers to the Nazi Judeocide, the deliberate and 
systematic killing of fi ve to six million Jews by Nazi Germany during the course 
of World War II. In the broader sense, the Holocaust encompasses Nazi efforts to 
eliminate Gypsies, Poles, homosexuals, the disabled, and others whose elimination 
served ideological goals distinct from the war effort. 
The Nazi Judeocide, however, is central even to this broader sense of the Holo-
caust. In a December 2000 letter, for example, the US Holocaust Memorial Museum 
urged potential new members “to help remember and memorialize the six million 
Jews and millions of others who died in the Holocaust.” The Holocaust here in-
cludes more than the six million Jews, but no other victims are specifi ed or counted. 
Even to the extent that it extends beyond the Nazi Judeocide, the Holocaust has a 
prototype-based internal structure in which the Nazi Judeocide is taken as central 
and defi ning (Johnson and Rittner, 1996). 
Whatever the scope and internal structure of the Holocaust, the key consideration 
for present purposes is the relation of the Holocaust to the concept of genocide. 
That relation is for most people, including scholars and educators, clear and simple: 
the Holocaust is widely construed as the prototypical instance of genocide. 
To construe the Holocaust as prototypical is not to say that it is typical. On the 
contrary, it is almost universally seen as extraordinary. A substantial scholarly lit-
erature is devoted to demonstrating that the Holocaust was and remains unique in 
history(Bauer, 1996; Katz, 1998). Some theorists, recognizing that every genocide 
is unique, pronounce the Holocaust to be “uniquely unique” (Heinsohn, 2000, p 
424). 
This purported exceptionality (for critiques, see Churchill, 1997; Fein, 1993; 
Stannard, 1998) is exactly what makes the Holocaust the archetypal and defi ning 
member of the greater concept that includes it, the standard against which all other 
genocides, and purported genocides, are measured. The Holocaust was “the most 
shocking event of the twentieth century”(Goldhagen, 1996, p. 4), the “most terrible 
event in modern history” (Weinberg, 1993, p. xiv), “a global attack on Western civ-
ilization itself”(Bauer, 1996, p.14).It was the “ultimate expression” (Strom and Par-
sons, 1982, p.1) of genocide. “[X]enophobic propensities reached their zenith in the 
twentieth century, when Hitler’s Nazi regime perpetuated [sic] the most extensive 
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effort at genocide in history” (Solomon, Greenberg and Pyszczynski, 2000, p. 200). 
“[O]nly in the case of Jewry under the Third Reich was such all-inclusive, non-
compromising, and unmitigated murder intended” (Katz, 1998, pp. 19–20). Others 
had broken the commandment “Thou shalt not kill,” but Hitler “was irreducibly dis-
tinct from other mega-murderers by abrogating it” (Heinsohn, 2000, p. 425). In a 
word, “[t]he Nazi regime was the most genocidal the world has ever seen” (Mann, 
2000, p. 331). 
Such claims are so standard in the Holocaust literature that even theorists and re-
searchers justly known for major contributions to the comparative study of geno-
cide occasionally slip into this sort of hyperbolic rhetoric. As “the ultimate ideolog-
ical genocide” (p. 323), argued Chalk and Jonassohn (1990), “the Holocaust stands 
alone in the history of the West and in the history of genocide” (p. 325). Its spe-
cial characteristics, concludes Charny (1994, p. 72), “have afforded the Holocaust a 
timeless meaning and a deserved position as the archetypal event of mass murder in 
human history.” 
A particularly good example of the Holocaust-based conceptual structure of 
genocide is the name of the fi rst academic journal ever devoted to the study of geno-
cide: Holocaust and Genocide Studies. Why not just “Genocide Studies”? Why this 
“Apples and Fruit” approach (Huttenbach, 1999, p. 9)? The answer is that genocide 
studies consist, in the standard view, of the study of the Holocaust and other geno-
cides. The title of the journal represents the core conceptualization of the fi eld. 
Consistent with this Holocaust-based concept of genocide, the content of Holo-
caust and Genocide Studies is overwhelmingly focused on the Holocaust. In the pe-
riod 1997 through 2000 (Vols. 11–14), out of a total of 53 published articles, there 
were 48 that focused exclusively on the Holocaust. Of the remaining fi ve, two ad-
dressed related oppressions of Jews during World War II, one addressed the relation of 
the Holocaust to other genocides, one addressed the Turkish extermination of the Ar-
menians during World War I, and one addressed a set of related Anatolian genocides. 
This focus on the Holocaust is not simply an editorial bias of a particular journal; 
rather, it represents the state of the fi eld. Although scholars, writers, and activists 
have addressed dozens of major genocides (Andreopoulos, 1994; Chalk and Jonas-
sohn, 1990; Charny, 1994; Churchill, 1997; Des Forges, 1999; Fein, 1993; Goure-
vitch, 1998; Hovannisian, 1999; Jonassohn and Bjornson, 1998; Melson, 1998; Mo-
ses, 2000; Scherrer, 1999; Stannard, 1992; Tatz, 1999), the Holocaust is by far the 
most extensively researched. Even when theorists of genocide attempt to address 
general issues rather than the specifi cs of a particular case, they routinely take the 
Holocaust as central to their analysis (Lerner, 1992; Staub, 1989). 
At a popular level, the Holocaust is surely the best-known genocide in the world. 
In the United States, for example, there are seven major Holocaust museums, in-
cluding the government-supported US Holocaust Memorial Museum, and system-
atic education about the Holocaust is required or recommended by at least 17 states 
(Finkelstein, 2000). Holocaust programs and curricula abound (Haynes, 1998; Ste-
phens et al., 1995; Strom and Parsons, 1982). 
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In stark contrast, there is to my knowledge no major museum or curriculum ded-
icated to any other genocide, not even the genocides committed against many of the 
indigenous peoples of what is now the United States (Churchill, 1997; Stannard, 
1992). To the extent that other genocides are considered at all, they can only be un-
derstood and discussed within a Holocaust-based conception of genocide. We may 
thus posit that the popular concept of genocide, and to a large extent the scholarly 
conception as well, is Holocaust-based. We think more about the Holocaust than 
about any other genocide, and we understand other genocides by analyzing their 
similarities to and differences from the Holocaust. 
Application of a Holocaust-based concept of genocide, as opposed to one based 
on some other genocide, substantially determines what events are construed as geno-
cidal. Every major historical event is a unique result of multiple intentions, choices, 
actions, structures, and forces at individual and collective levels. If our concept of 
genocide is prototype-based, we determine whether some event or set of events con-
stitutes genocide on the basis of its similarities to and differences from what we 
have taken to be the prototypical genocide. Applying a Holocaust-based concept of 
genocide, in particular, people identify genocides on the basis of whether an event is 
suffi ciently similar to the Holocaust in what they take to be relevant respects. Thus 
an overlapping but somewhat different set of historical events might have been seen 
as genocidal if our prototype, instead of the Holocaust, had been, say, the Armenian 
genocide of World War I (Hovannisian, 1999; Melson, 1998); the Cambodian geno-
cide of the late 1970s (Hannum, 1989; Kiernan, 1994); the Rwandan genocide of 
1994 (DesForges, 1999; Gourevitch, 1998); one of the numerous genocides associ-
ated with the European conquest of the Americas, Africa, and Australia (Chalk and 
Jonassohn, 1990; Churchill, 1997; Jonassohn and Bjornson, 1998; Moses, 2000; 
Stannard, 1992; Tatz, 1999); or any of the myriad other genocides of human his-
tory (Andreopoulos, 1994; Chalk and Jonassohn, 1990; Fein, 1993; Jonassohn and 
Bjornson, 1998; Scherrer, 1999). 
Regardless of what genocide we choose as prototypical, moreover, we face the 
problem that, because prototype-based concepts have fuzzy boundaries, their appli-
cation is highly subject to a variety of cognitive biases. One of these is a well-doc-
umented general tendency to seek and interpret data in such a way as to maintain 
one’s beliefs (Klaczynski, 2000; Moshman, 1998, 1999; Stanovich, 1999). Proto-
type-based concepts may shrink or expand selectively so as to avoid or reconstrue 
discomfi ting observations. 
Given a Holocaust-based concept of genocide, for example, one’s political ide-
ology and patriotic commitments can be expected to have substantial infl uence on 
what one views as suffi ciently like the Holocaust to constitute genocide. To the ex-
tent that one is supportive of a given government, for example, one is (a) less likely 
to perceive ways in which its actions are similar to those of Nazi Germany; (b) less 
likely to acknowledge the relevance of whatever similarities one does perceive; (c) 
more likely to perceive ways in which the government’s actions differ from those 
of Nazi Germany; and(d) more likely to highlight the relevance of those differ-
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ences. Analogous problems hold regardless of what genocide serves as the proto-
type. The combination of a prototype-based concept of genocide with the general 
cognitive tendency to perceive and interpret evidence in such a way as to maintain 
one’s views renders one less likely to construe the actions of favored governments 
as genocidal. 
Consider, for example, the systematic extermination of the indigenous inhabit-
ants of Australia by Europeans and their descendants. Although today this is seen 
by most Australians as regrettable, few label this genocide. Genocide means some-
thing like the Holocaust, which means death camps. Tatz (1999) summarizes this 
line of thinking thus: “Clearly there has been no Australian Auschwitz. Clearly, if 
there was no Auschwitz here, then no genocide occurred here” (p. 316). Similarly, 
although the European conquest of the Americas has involved deliberate mass kill-
ings of countless millions of individuals and has eliminated hundreds of cultures on 
two continents over more than fi ve centuries, the absence of death camps enables 
the nations of the Americas to deny that they were founded on genocide and that, in 
many cases, these genocides are still in progress (Churchill, 1997). 
A different selection of the prototypical genocide would yield different conclu-
sions about the genocidal nature of various historical events, but such conclusions 
would be no more justifi able that those generated by a Holocaust based conception. 
Suppose, for example, that we construed the European conquest of the Americas as 
a singular and ultimate set of interrelated genocides. This mega-genocide, we might 
note, has been deliberately aimed at, and has succeeded in eliminating, hundreds of 
discrete cultures throughout the Americas. Moreover, it has for the most part been a 
consensus policy, pursued generation after generation by the governments of mul-
tiple colonial and emerging nations, including the United States, regardless of who 
held political power (Churchill, 1997; Stannard, 1992). With this as our prototype, 
we might evaluate apparent genocides with respect to the number of cultures elim-
inated, the duration of the genocidal processes, and the breadth of support for those 
processes. The Holocaust, from this perspective, might be dismissed as relatively 
minor, having targeted only a handful of cultures and having ended after just a few 
years when the Nazi regime was defeated by forces opposed to the genocide. 
Such minimization of the Holocaust is obviously indefensible. It is no different, 
however, than the routine genocide denials that result from taking the Holocaust as 
unique and/or prototypical (Churchill, 1997; Stannard, 1998). An alternative con-
ception based on, say, the Cambodian genocide would be quite different from any-
thing yet discussed, but it too, if taken as the ultimate conception, would drastically 
constrain our comprehension. Any prototype-based conception of genocide has the 
potential to highlight important features of genocide underplayed by conceptions 
rooted in other prototypes, but no such conception can ever be defi nitive. 
The path beyond a Holocaust-based concept of genocide, then, cannot consist of 
a search for the one true prototype of genocide. What we need, I suggest, is a con-
ception of genocide based on abstract criteria—a formal conception of genocide. 
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Formal conceptions of genocide 
We might enhance our objectivity in addressing genocide if we could replace the 
standard Holocaust-based conception with one rooted in formal criteria. The elabo-
ration of a formal conception of genocide, however, is no easy task. If we had a de-
fi nitive list of genocides we might try to determine what they had in common, but 
how can we prepare such a list unless we already have a defi nition of genocide? We 
could prepare a preliminary list on the basis of our intuitions as to what sort of acts 
are genocidal, but those intuitions may be overly infl uenced by implicit Holocaust-
based (or other prototype-based) conceptions. Moreover, the entire enterprise of de-
vising criteria for genocide may be infl uenced by self-serving motivations to clas-
sify, or not classify, particular historical events as genocidal. 
Despite these diffi culties, the value of a formal conception has been widely rec-
ognized and a variety of formal defi nitions of genocide have been proposed. The 
best known of these is provided by the 1948 United Nations Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (reprinted in Andreopoulos, 
1994; Chalk and Jonassohn, 1990), which defi nes genocide as 
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a na-
tional, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately 
infl icting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical de-
struction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within 
the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
Among scholars of genocide, this defi nition is almost universally deemed to be seri-
ously fl awed. Kuper (1994), despite reservations, grudgingly acknowledged that the 
UN conception “provides a workable defi nitional core for interdisciplinary analysis 
and application” (p. 31).Others, even more skeptical, have felt compelled to offer 
alternative defi nitions and typologies. 
Fein (1993), like most theorists, believes the defi nition of genocide should be 
broadened to include political, economic, and other victim groups beyond those 
named in the UN Convention. Other than this, however, her defi nition is close to 
that of the UN: 
Genocide is sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a col-
lectivity directly or indirectly, through interdiction of the biological and social repro-
duction of group members, sustained regardless of the surrender or lack of threat of-
fered by the victim. (p. 24) 
Chalk and Jonassohn (1990) agree with Fein that the UN defi nition is too restrictive 
with regard to victim groups but prefer to defi ne such groups from the viewpoint of 
the perpetrator, which may act against groups such as demonic witches or “enemies 
of the people” that have no objective existence. Moreover, in contrast to both the 
Convention and Fein, they would limit genocide to mass killings by governments 
and quasi-governmental authorities: 
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Genocide is a form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority in-
tends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defi ned by the perpe-
trator. (p. 23, italics in original) 
Charny (1994) shares with Chalk and Jonassohn a conception of genocide limited 
to mass killings, excluding other forms of group extermination recognized as geno-
cidal by the UN and Fein. Charny is appalled, however, that under some defi nitions 
“thousands and even millions of defenseless victims of mass murder do not “qual-
ify” as victims of genocide” (p. 64), warning that “the masses of bodies that are not 
to be qualifi ed for the defi nition of genocide are dumped into a conceptual black 
hole, where they are forgotten” (p. 92). Though narrow in its exclusive focus on 
mass killings, Charny’s defi nition is broader than that of Chalk and Jonassohn in al-
lowing for non-governmental perpetrators and is broader than any of the defi nitions 
yet discussed in that it deletes the requirement of intent and encompasses lethal acts 
that were not aimed at any defi nable group, real or imaginary: 
Genocide in the generic sense is the mass killing of substantial numbers of human 
beings, when not in the course of military action against the military forces of an 
avowed enemy, under conditions of the essential defenselessness and helplessness of 
the victims. (p. 75) 
Churchill (1997) provides an especially detailed analysis of how political accom-
modations and Holocaust-based conceptions have compromised both the UN defi ni-
tion and the efforts of scholars. Looking back to the original work of Raphael Lem-
kin, originator of the term “genocide,” Churchill proposes that genocide is “a denial 
of the right of existence of entire human groups, as homicide is the denial of the 
right to live of individual human beings” (p. 431). 
Genocide, proposes Churchill, 
means the destruction, entirely or in part, of any racial, ethnic, national, religious, 
cultural, linguistic, political, economic, gender, or other human group, however such 
groups maybe defi ned by the perpetrator.(p. 432) 
Specifi c genocides refl ect various combinations of three primary forms. One of 
these forms is “Physical Genocide, by which is meant killing members of the tar-
geted group(s) …” (p. 432). A second is “Biological Genocide, by which is meant 
the prevention of births within the target group(s) …” (p. 433). The third is 
Cultural Genocide, by which is meant the destruction of the specifi c character of the 
targeted group(s) through destruction or expropriation of its means of economic per-
petuation; prohibition or curtailment of its language; suppression of its religious, so-
cial or political practices; destruction or denial of access to its religious or other sites, 
shrines, or institutions; destruction or denial of use and access to objects of sacred or 
sociocultural signifi cance; forced dislocation, expulsion or dispersal of its members; 
forced transfer or removal of its children, or any other means. (p. 433) 
Churchill carefully denies that any of these three forms is intrinsically more grave 
a crime than any other, even in those cases where they can be distinguished, but he 
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does not deny that some perpetrators of genocide are more culpable than others. 
Pursuing the analogy of genocide to murder, he distinguishes four degrees of geno-
cide, the most serious of which is “Genocide in the First Degree, which consists of 
instances in which evidence of premeditated intent to commit genocide is present” 
(p. 434). 
Many other defi nitions and typologies of genocide exist in the literature (Horow-
itz, 1997; Rummel, 1994; Scherrer, 1999; for reviews, see Chalk and Jonassohn, 
1990; Churchill, 1997; Fein, 1993). The process of articulating, justifying, criticiz-
ing, coordinating, and reconstructing such conceptions may lead to some measure of 
defi nitional agreement and thus to some measure of consensus in identifying cases 
of genocide in history and recognizing genocides in the future. Even without agree-
ment on a particular conception, moreover, discussion and refl ection with regard to 
multiple defi nitions and typologies may yield greater objectivity in the identifi ca-
tion and analysis of genocides by directing attention to a variety of relevant consid-
erations. As we will now see, however, formal conceptions have limitations of their 
own. 
Conceptual constraints on thinking about catastrophic violations of human 
rights 
Holocaust-based conceptions of genocide, I have argued, have hindered our abil-
ity to recognize and understand other genocides. Extending the analysis, I argue in 
this section that genocide-based conceptions of human rights catastrophes have hin-
dered our ability to recognize and understand other catastrophic violations of human 
rights. The solution to this problem, however, lies not in reliance on some particu-
lar formal defi nition and typology of human rights catastrophes but rather in greater 
consciousness regarding the role of our conceptions in our thinking. 
Genocide-based conceptions of human rights catastrophes 
Genocide is routinely taken to be “the absolute crime, the gravest form of crime 
against humanity” (Ternon, 1999, p. 238). As “the most barbaric crime”(Scherrer, 
1999, p. 14), it constitutes “the ultimate human rights violation” (Jonassohn and 
Bjornson, 1998, p. 98). In both popular and scholarly discourse, statements of this 
sort are widely accepted as “self-evident” (Jonassohn and Bjornson, 1998, p. 98)—
so obviously true that they require no justifi cation. 
I suggested earlier that the title of the journal Holocaust and Genocide Studies 
refl ects a Holocaust-based conception of genocide. Analogous to Holocaust and 
Genocide Studies, at the next higher level of abstraction, is the title of Jonassohn 
and Bjornson’s (1998) Genocide and Gross Human Rights Violations, an important 
compendium of theory, methodology, and case studies. 
Why did the authors call this book Genocide and Gross Human Rights Viola-
tions? Why not simply “Gross Human Rights Violations”? Surely genocide is in-
cluded in that category. The short answer, I think, is that genocide, universally taken 
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to be the ultimate evil, lies at the core of what the book is about. To represent accu-
rately the scope of the book, the term genocide needs to be in the title. 
In that case, however, why not just call the book Genocide? Jonassohn and Bjorn-
son (1998) suggest that this would be excessively and arbitrarily restrictive. Choos-
ing historical cases for discussion in the book would require that these cases meet 
some defi nition of genocide. Given the diverse defi nitions of genocide in the lit-
erature, however, what counts as genocide varies substantially depending on what 
defi nition one uses. The authors explain that the book’s title “signifi es the plan to 
include in our analysis many cases that may violate one or another defi nition—in-
cluding our own—while meeting some of the terms of most of them” (p. xiii). 
This expanded plan for the book suggests that genocide lies at the core of a larger 
concept, a concept with no name and no clear boundaries. The concept of geno-
cide can be extended to defi ne a larger category of which it is a part. That larger cat-
egory, it appears, has a prototype-based structure with genocide at its core. It con-
sists of genocide plus a vaguely characterized set of quasi-genocidal phenomena, 
phenomena suffi ciently like genocide to be classifi ed with it in the unnamed and ill-
defi ned larger category of “gross human rights violations.” The title Genocide and 
Gross Human Rights Violations, then, communicates what the book is about as ac-
curately as any possible brief title could do. 
The dilemma for Jonassohn and Bjornson, it appears, is that their book is in-
tended to address an important category of social and historical phenomena that has 
yet to be adequately conceptualized and named. If we are able to reconstruct our 
conceptualizations we may fi nd words to communicate more precisely about these 
matters in the future. For the time being, however, we can only communicate on the 
basis of our existing concepts and terminology. Thus we face the conceptual diffi -
culty of communicating about a subject larger than genocide for which we have no 
name. 
Genocide, then, is prototypical in the sense that it anchors and defi nes the larger 
category of which it is a part. In the realm of mass atrocities, genocide is concep-
tualized as the evil beyond all others, the ultimate measure of all human rights 
violations. 
This construal of genocide as the ultimate crime greatly raises the stakes with 
regard to the identifi cation of genocides. If genocide is the gravest form of crime 
against humanity, then many catastrophic violations of human rights, including 
massive ethnic cleansings, extended religious inquisitions, coordinated political dis-
appearances, systematic programs of torture, and multigenerational chattel slavery, 
are less grave, unless it can be shown that they meet some set of criteria for geno-
cide. Even some mass killings and cultural exterminations may fail to qualify as 
genocidal depending on one’s conception. Defi nitions, in other words, will substan-
tially determine who has committed—and who has been the victim of—the worst of 
all human crimes. 
Once we single out genocide as the worst of all crimes, then, various groups and 
governments and their political supporters and opponents have strong incentive to 
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apply, or not apply, this label to various historical events. Some will perceive ways 
that human rights atrocities of special concern to them are suffi ciently genocidal to 
be classifi ed among the worst of all crimes. Others will argue that these historical 
events are perhaps regrettable but far from genocidal. 
Political pressures inevitably infl uence determinations of whether an event is 
genocidal, and this is greatly intensifi ed to the extent that genocide is construed as 
the worst of all crimes. As we saw earlier, formal conceptions of genocide serve a 
useful role in limiting the ambiguities of prototype-based concepts. Is there a role 
more generally for formal defi nitions and typologies with regard to catastrophic vi-
olations of human rights? 
Formal conceptions of human rights catastrophes 
A formal conception of genocide enhances our objectivity in identifying genocides 
by setting forth an interrelated set of necessary and suffi cient conditions for some-
thing to be identifi ed as genocidal. In comparison with a prototype-based concep-
tion of genocide, a formal conception may make it more diffi cult to deny the geno-
cidal nature of a historical event. It will not suffi ces imply to distinguish the alleged 
genocide in some way from what is taken to be the prototypical genocide. If the for-
mal criteria are met, the event is genocidal. 
If the criteria are not met, however, the event is not genocidal, even if it substan-
tially resembles some genuine genocides. Formal criteria place marginal cases on 
one side or the other of a relatively sharp line of demarcation. Thus, although use-
ful in constraining genocide denial, formal criteria overdifferentiate genocides from 
other human rights catastrophes. This overdifferentiation of genocides from other 
human rights catastrophes would be a threat to comprehension of important simi-
larities in any event, but is especially serious given the widespread sense that geno-
cide is the ultimate human rights catastrophe. If genocide is the ultimate crime, then 
to say something is not genocidal is to suggest that it is less evil, that its perpetrators 
are less culpable than the perpetrators of genocide, and/or that its victims have been 
less seriously victimized. 
Would distinctions between genocides and non-genocides be more defensible and 
useful if we had a formal typology of catastrophic human rights violations? Such a 
typology would provide labels for all types of mass atrocities and relatively objec-
tive criteria for assigning such atrocities to the proper categories. Whereas geno-
cide-based conceptions of human rights catastrophes beg the question of the moral 
relation of genocide to other mass atrocities—what is most genocidal is by defi ni-
tion most evil—a formal conception may enable us to address more objectively the 
question of whether some mass atrocities are worse than others and, if so, on what 
basis such comparisons can be made. 
There may indeed be value in attempting to devise a formal typology of hu-
man rights catastrophes, but we should not expect too much from this endeavor. 
It is logically possible that there could be a world in which most human rights ca-
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tastrophes fall more or less neatly into some fi nite number of mutually exclusive 
categories. Empirically, however, it appears that we do not live in such a world 
(Jonassohn and Bjornson, 1998). Catastrophic violations of human rights nearly al-
ways fall into multiple categories, regardless of what system of categories we use. 
When human rights are violated at massive levels, they are almost always violated 
in multiple ways. 
With due allowance for the uniqueness of every historical event, we can and 
should recognize a variety of general labels applicable to human rights catastro-
phes. Such labels might include mass killing, cultural extermination, ethnic cleans-
ing, political disappearances, religious inquisition, programmatic torture, chattel 
slavery, and, of course, genocide. But these categories, which are surely not exhaus-
tive, overlap in intricate ways: Mass killings may serve political and/or religious 
purposes and/or as a means of ethnic cleansing and/or cultural extermination. Cul-
tural extermination may be the desired, expected, or unexpected outcome of ethnic 
cleansing. Political disappearances and religious inquisitions are routinely linked to 
systematic programs of torture. Chattel slavery may entail mass killings, program-
matic torture, and/or the extermination of cultures. Genocide overlaps the categories 
of mass killing and cultural extermination in different ways depending on what def-
inition one applies. 
In sum, we should not expect to achieve a defi nitive set of exhaustive, precise, 
and mutually exclusive categories within which every mass atrocity can be assigned 
and labeled. A meaningful and useful conception of human rights catastrophes may 
consist instead of a complex network of prototype-based and quasi-formal concepts 
within which specifi c cases can be conceptualized and interrelated. 
Is genocide the worst of all crimes? 
I have perhaps fi nessed the question with which I began the discussion of genocide-
based concepts. And I am, perhaps, about to fi nesse it again. But I am now prepared 
to be more direct in explaining why an abstract moral evaluation of genocide in re-
lation to other human rights catastrophes is less meaningful than one might expect. 
Recall Churchill’s (1997) foundational analogy of genocide to murder. Whereas 
murder denies individual human beings the right of existence, “genocide is a denial 
of the right of existence of entire human groups” (p. 431). Existence, it might be ar-
gued, is prerequisite for anything else. Its denial is thus the denial of everything, the 
ultimate violation of human rights. It seems to follow that murder is the ultimate 
crime against an individual and genocide the ultimate crime against a group. 
But is every murder worse than every other crime? Suppose you carry out a plan 
to kill a man who raped your daughter, whereas I kidnap children and torture them 
for years, leaving them traumatized for life. Only you have committed murder, but 
it is not obvious that your crime is worse than mine. There may be no general cate-
gory of crime that qualifi es abstractly as worse than ending someone’s life, but there 
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are particular crimes that, although they fall short of homicide, are arguably worse 
than particular murders. 
Similarly, even if genocide is in some abstract sense the ultimate crime against a 
social group, it does not follow that every genocide is morally worse than anything 
that fails to qualify as genocide. Consider, for example, the Atlantic slave trade, a 
deliberate process that, over a period of centuries, killed millions of individuals and 
delivered millions more to lives of degradation for themselves and their descen-
dants (Drescher, 1998). Even if we were to determine that this process fails to meet 
some defensible defi nition of genocide, perhaps because killing and cultural exter-
mination were not the primary intent, it is far from obvious that the Atlantic slave 
trade is thereby less evil than any genocide. It is not even obvious that it is less evil 
than the Holocaust. 
More generally, there are at least three reasons for caution in designating some 
mass atrocities as worse than others. First, as we have seen, there is substantial am-
biguity about what qualifi es as a genocide. In part this is due to legitimate disagree-
ment among scholars over defi nitions and criteria. In part it is due to political pres-
sures that lead to gerrymandering of defi nitions and self-serving interpretations and 
applications of criteria. In any event, we should be wary of putting too much weight 
on these classifi cations in evaluating relative levels of evil or horror. 
Second, even if we could agree on a defi nition of genocide and could be utterly 
objective in applying it, actual human rights catastrophes, as we have seen, nearly 
always spill across any set of conceptual categories (Jonassohn and Bjornson, 
1998). Genocidal elements can be detected in many or most cases of mass killing, 
cultural extermination, ethnic cleansing, political disappearances, religious inquisi-
tion, group enslavement, and other atrocities. Even if genocide is indeed the ulti-
mate crime, we cannot categorically distinguish acts that meet this threshold of evil 
from those that do not. Rather, we might use the lens of genocide to bring into focus 
the most evil and horrifying aspects of a wide variety of crimes against groups. 
Finally, at both an individual and collective level, there are fates arguably 
worse than death. Some individuals and groups, for example, might reasonably 
consider some circumstances of slavery or torture to be worse than annihilation. 
Thus, even the abstract notion of the ultimate evil of murder and genocide may be 
open to question. 
Evaluating the relative evil and horror of specifi c mass atrocities is for the most 
part an impossible and pointless enterprise. Although genocide is to other crimes 
against groups as murder is to other crimes against individuals, we should be wary 
of concluding that genocide is ultimate in some abstract sense and should serve as 
the measure of other mass atrocities. Genocide-based conceptions of human rights 
catastrophes may provide useful insights but may also distort our vision. As we 
have seen, however, formal conceptions are no panacea. What, then, are we to 
do? 
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Conceptualization and consciousness 
As we have seen, prototype-based and formal conceptions each have their uses and 
limits. Psychological research does not support a general picture of conceptual de-
velopment as a shift from one type of concept to another (Rosser, 1994). Rather, 
it appears that conceptual progress consists primarily of achieving higher lev-
els of awareness regarding the nature and limitations of our concepts and, corre-
spondingly, increasing control over their application and coordination (Kuhn, 1999; 
Moshman, 1998, 1999). With regard to genocide, a shift from Holocaust-based to 
formal conceptions would, I have argued, represent major progress. In the long run, 
however, what is most needed is a shift from the automatic application of fi xed con-
ceptions to the increasingly deliberate application and coordination of a variety of 
justifi able conceptions. The goal is not to achieve some fi nal set of correct concepts 
but rather to enhance our consciousness regarding a variety of conceptual possibil-
ities and the potential interrelations among these. Coordination of multiple defi ni-
tions and taxonomies may enhance our understanding of complex realities that can-
not be subsumed adequately within any simple set of categories. 
Consider, for example, what I presented earlier as fi ve major formal concep-
tions of genocide—those of the United Nations, Fein (1993), Chalk and Jonassohn 
(1990), Charny (1994), and Churchill (1997). Any of these conceptions is, in my 
view, far more defensible and useful than any prototype-based concept of genocide. 
But which of these formal conceptions is best? To choose among them, we must 
consider a series of dimensions along which they differ: 
• Is genocide limited to actions taken against “national, ethnical, racial or reli-
gious” groups, as specifi ed in the UN defi nition, or does it include actions against 
political, economic, and other groups, as in the other four defi nitions? 
• Is genocide limited to victims defi ned on the basis of objective group member-
ship (UN, Fein, Churchill) or group membership as perceived by the perpetrator 
(Chalk and Jonassohn), or does it encompass a wider range of victims (Charny)? 
• Is genocide limited to mass killing (Chalk and Jonassohn, Charny), does it in-
clude some non-lethal means of group destruction (UN, Fein), or does it encom-
pass all means of cultural extermination (Churchill)? 
• Is genocide limited to actions taken by governmental and quasi-governmental au-
thorities (Chalk and Jonassohn) or does it include actions by non-governmental 
perpetrators (UN, Fein, Charny, Churchill). 
• Is genocide limited to acts that are intended to destroy (UN, Fein, Chalk and 
Jonassohn) or can genocides vary in their degree of intentionality (Charny, 
Churchill)? 
Formal conceptions serve a useful purpose in raising questions of this sort, but may 
limit our understanding if we feel compelled to provide defi nitive answers and pro-
ceed from these to overly sharp categorizations (Charny, 1994). To take just one ex-
ample, consider the relation of genocide to cultural extermination. Churchill uses 
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the term “cultural genocide” to refer to what a number of theorists—including Fein 
(1993), Chalk and Jonassohn (1990), and Charny (1994)—have called “ethnocide.” 
This refl ects Churchill’s conception of genocide as fully encompassing forms of cul-
tural extermination that do not rely on mass killing. 
Is ethnocide a type of genocide? If we accept a narrow defi nition of genocide as 
mass killing (Chalk and Jonassohn, 1990; Charny, 1994), it follows that many delib-
erate and successful efforts to eliminate various of the world’s human cultures were 
something different from (and perhaps something less than) genocide. If we defi ne 
genocide too broadly, however, the term may encompass such a heterogeneous set 
of phenomena as to be little more than an expression of extreme horror (Chalk and 
Jonassohn, 1990; Fein, 1993, 1994). Does Churchill (1997) go too far? 
In addressing an issue of defi nition, we should recognize at the start that defi ni-
tions are social conventions, not empirical truths about the world. Events are not in-
herently genocidal or not genocidal. It is up to us to determine what we mean by 
genocide. 
That said, it does not follow that any defi nition is as good, or as arbitrary, as any 
other. Some defi nitions may be more meaningful and useful than others, and this 
depends in part on what the world is like. Thus, although defi nitions are not truths 
about the world, there may be empirical and other grounds for preferring one defi ni-
tion to another. 
Churchill (1997) provides both a conventional and an empirical argument in sup-
port of his case that what others call ethnocide should be construed as a form of 
genocide. First, he argues that this is faithful to the Raphael Lemkin’s original con-
ception of genocide. Others have since narrowed that conception but, given the 
term’s origin, it would not be a radical break with conventional usage to adopt a 
broader conception. On the contrary, this would be a return to the original meaning 
of the term. 
Second, Churchill argues on empirical grounds that mass killings generally co-
occur with other forms of cultural extermination. Thus a distinction between geno-
cide and ethnocide, at least in our world, is not a distinction between two discrete 
processes but rather between what are typically two aspects of a single process. This 
does not make the distinction between genocide and ethnocide false but it does sug-
gest that such a distinction is artifi cial and misleading. Defi ning genocide to encom-
pass general processes of cultural extermination, including but not limited to mass 
killings, is not the one true conceptualization but, given the evidence, it seems the 
most useful. 
Personally, I fi nd Churchill’s case for this aspect of his defi nition convincing. 
More important than recommending Churchill’s defi nition, however, I recommend 
awareness of the options, arguments, evidence, and choices that led to Churchill’s 
defi nition of genocide, with full recognition that such consciousness could direct a 
reasonable person toward a different conceptualization. Progress in our understand-
ing of genocide, I suggest, will come about not only through good choices of defi ni-
tions but through greater consciousness of our conceptualizations. 
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Such consciousness, in fact, may counter some of the disadvantages of settling 
on a single formal conception. Even if we classify ethnocide as a form of geno-
cide, for example, awareness of the choice we have made may help us remain aware 
of the threat to conceptual clarity inherent in broad undifferentiated conceptions. 
Rather than settle for a broad defi nition of genocide, we may choose (as Churchill 
does) to create a typology within that defi nition that recaptures the distinctions oth-
ers have deemed important. 
Correspondingly, adoption of a narrower conception of genocide that excludes 
non-lethal ethnocides may lead us to ignore or minimize the signifi cance of events 
that do not qualify as genocide. Consciousness of this choice and its potential conse-
quences, however, may direct our attention toward the similarities and interrelations 
between ethnocide and genocide, including the possibility of classifying these to-
gether as part of some superordinate, and yet to be named, category (Charny, 1994). 
This raises the possibility that ethnocides and other non-genocides may be no less 
evil than genocide. 
In sum, although some defi nitions and typologies are more defensible and use-
ful than some others, thinking objectively about these matters is not just a matter of 
choosing the correct conception. More important than this may be consciousness re-
garding the nature and justifi ability of various conceptual options and the theoreti-
cal and practical consequences of our choices among these options. 
Consider, for example, the following sets of events: 
(a) the massacres of all inhabitants of hundreds of villages in El Salvador, Guate-
mala, and elsewhere by US-supported battalions during the Latin American 
“dirty wars” of the 1970s and 1980s (Danner, 1994); 
(b) the political “disappearances,” tortures, and killings of tens of thousands of 
students and other young adults in Argentina, Chile, and elsewhere during 
this same period (Bouvard, 1994; Guest, 1990); 
(c) the deadly exploitation of millions of Africans that depopulated the Congo 
around the turn of the 20th century under the rule of Belgium’s King Leop-
old (Hochschild, 1998); 
(d) the deliberate starvation of millions in the centrally orchestrated famines of 
Stalin’s Soviet Union (Chalk and Jonassohn, 1990; Jonassohn and Bjornson, 
1998); 
(e) the 1989 massacre of thousands of dissident students in China’s Tiananmen 
Square (Charny, 1994); 
(f) the Cherokee Trail of Tears and other ethnic cleansings associated with the 
consolidation and westward expansion of the United States (Churchill, 1997; 
Stannard, 1992); 
(g) the deliberate mass destruction of civilian populations in Dresden, Tokyo, Hi-
roshima, and Nagasaki during World War II (Fein, 1994; Kuper, 1994); and 
(h) the Rape of Nanking (Chang, 1997). 
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Depending on what defi nition we use, we may determine that some of these cases 
should be called genocides and some not. Such categorizations can be useful, es-
pecially when they are made on the basis of objective formal criteria. But what we 
need most is consciousness of the bases for these categorizations, the various di-
mensions along which evils of this magnitude can be compared. The point is not to 
decide that one mass atrocity is worse than some other but to understand their vari-
ous characteristics and interrelations. 
The same considerations hold with regard to students. As noted earlier, education 
about genocide is typically limited to the Holocaust, “the darkest chapter of our his-
tory” (Stephens et al, 1995, p.2), with a few examples, perhaps, of what are taken 
to be lesser genocides and other violations of human rights. Such curricula instill or 
reinforce Holocaust-based conceptions of genocide and genocide-based conceptions 
of human rights, and thus may serve more to obfuscate than to clarify and educate. 
Genocide curricula may counter Holocaust-based conceptions by presenting a va-
riety of genocidal and quasi-genocidal events and encouraging students to consider 
these on the basis of formal defi nitions and taxonomies. The purpose of a genocide 
curriculum should not be to indoctrinate students in a particular formal conception 
of genocide or particular conclusions about what events are or are not genocidal, 
nor should it be to secure an unshakable commitment to particular courses of action. 
Rather, genocide curricula should aim to enhance students’ consciousness about the 
various dimensions along which genocides differ from each other and from other 
catastrophic violations of human rights and about the associated theoretical and 
practical options and arguments. The intent is not to instill particular conceptions 
but to enhance students’ powers of conceptualization. Our aim should be to foster 
students’ ability to formulate, articulate, and justify defensible views of their own, 
and to act on the basis of those views. 
Conclusion 
The Holocaust, observes Flanzbaum (1999, p. 102), has attained a “cult-like status” 
that “has been augmented by its use as a touchstone of victimization.” It “frequently 
enters discussions of ethnicity by becoming a measuring stick against which all op-
pression is compared.” Not only does this distort our understanding of genocide, it 
distorts our understanding of oppression—not to mention our understanding of the 
Holocaust itself. Through formal criteria and greater consciousness of our conceptu-
alizations, I have argued, we can better comprehend the nature and diversity of hu-
man rights catastrophes. 
This analysis, some might fear, has the potential to trivialize the Holocaust. To 
acknowledge other genocides, however, is not to deny the horror of the genocide 
that has most shocked the conscience of the world. Even if the Holocaust loses its 
artifi cially induced special status, it remains what it has always been—a nightmare 
reality of concentration, starvation, deportation, massacres, ethnic cleansing, slave 
labor, industrialized mass killings, and deliberate group exterminations, a horror no 
one will ever fully comprehend. 
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But now we know that there are many such horrors, that genocides and other 
atrocities that defy easy comprehension have occurred all over the world throughout 
the course of history and continue unabated (Chalk and Jonassohn, 1990; Charny, 
1994; Chomsky, 1989; Churchill, 1997; Fein, 1993; Jonassohn and Bjornson, 1998; 
Rummel, 1994). The Holocaust is both worse than we can ever imagine as well as a 
small part of a much larger picture. 
This is a terrifying vision. The conceptual constraints that restrict our thinking 
about genocide and other mass atrocities are reinforced by emotional constraints 
on facing horrors of this sort. Thus we readily reduce the myriad catastrophic viola-
tions of human rights to genocide, reduce genocide to the Holocaust, and reduce the 
Holocaust to a singular event of the past. Through such conceptualizations we con-
tain our initial horror within a righteous sense of moral resolve to see that nothing 
like the Holocaust ever happens again. 
But things like the Holocaust, whether or not we acknowledge them and whether 
or not we have language to describe them, are happening all the time. It is not clear 
how much we will ever face, much less teach, about this. What is clear is that our 
conceptions in this area are grossly inadequate, and that greater consciousness of 
our conceptualizations is critical for greater understanding. 
Note 
* This article evolved from a brief paper presented at Contemporary Forms of Genocide: 
An International Symposium, University of Nebraska–Lincoln, April, 1996. I am grateful to 
Ellen McWhirter for insightful and helpful comments on the original paper. Reprint requests 
and other inquiries should be directed to David Moshman at the Department of Educational 
Psychology, University of Nebraska–Lincoln, Lincoln, NE 68588–0345, USA; or via email: 
dmoshman1@unl.edu 
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